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This paper analyzes the authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol for universal mobile telecommunications system
(UMTS) mobile networks, where a new protocol is proposed. In our proposed protocol, the mobile station is responsible for
generating of authentication token (AUTN) and random number (RAND). The home location register is responsible for compari-
son of response and expected response to take a decision. Therefore, the bottleneck at authentication center is avoided by reducing
the number of messages between mobile and authentication center. The authentication time delay, call setup time, and signalling
traﬃc are minimized in the proposed protocol. A fluid mobility model is used to investigate the performance of signalling traﬃc
and load transaction messages between mobile database, such as home location register (HLR) and visitor location register (VLR)
for both the current protocol and the proposed protocol. The simulation results show that the authentication delay and current
load transaction messages between entities and bandwidth are minimized as compared to current protocol. Therefore, the perfor-
mance and the authentication delay time have been improved significantly.
Copyright © 2006 J. Al-Saraireh and S. Yousef. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
In order to provide security services in wireless networks, au-
thentication is used as an initial process to authorize a mobile
terminal for communication through secret credentials [1].
In authentication process, a mobile terminal is required to
submit secret materials such as certificate or “challenge and
response” values for verification [2]. Without strong authen-
tication, mobile networks access is unprotected through the
release of message contents, and modification of message or
denial of service can be accomplished easily by an intruder.
There are diﬀerent approaches done to enhance UMTS
authentication mechanisms, there are four approaches being
discussed in Europe [3]. The 1st scheme is proposed by Royal
Holloway College. This protocol is a symmetric scheme, it
works with a challenge response mechanism and it oﬀers a
mutual authentication of the user and the network operator
as well as confidentiality about the user identity towards the
network operator. In general the mechanism consists of five
messages, which are exchanged between the user, the network
operator, and the service provider. If the user has already
logged on at the network operator who possesses a tempo-
rary identity, two of the five messages are dropped and the
service provider is not involved. The 2nd scheme is proposed
by Siemens. It is an asymmetric protocol. This protocol re-
quires five messages, which are exchanged between the user,
the network operator, and a certificate server storing certified
copies of the necessary public keys. Only three messages are
required for this without a certificate server being involved.
The 3rd scheme is proposed by KPN. It is a variant of the
station-to-station (STS) protocol and similar to the proto-
col that was developed by Siemens as far as the message flow
and the mechanism of key exchange are concerned. The 4th
scheme is proposed by Siegen University. This protocol is
based on asymmetrical certified-based algorithms. By mak-
ing use of time variant parameters, digital signatures supply
the authentication of the communicating partners.
In this paper, analysis model is used to investigate the per-
formance of signalling traﬃc, load, and bandwidth that are
generated by these protocols as well as the delay in the call
setup time. Also, a new protocol is proposed to improve the
performance of authentication by reducing the authentica-
tion times and signalling messages.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 speci-
fies and describes the AKA protocol in 3G. In Section 3,
the UMTS authentication protocol is analyzed. A pro-
posed authentication protocol for UMTS mobile networks
is described in Section 4. The traﬃc load in the proposed
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Figure 1: Authentications and key agreement protocol.
authentication protocol is analyzed in Section 5. In Section 6,
simulation results, comparison, and discussion between the
two protocols are presented. The paper is concluded in
Section 7.
2. UMTS AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
In UMTS, three components participate in authentication.
(1) Mobile station (MS) and UMTS subscriber identity
module (USIM).
(2) Base station (BS), mobile switching center (MSC), and
visitor location register (VLR).
(3) Authentication center (AuC) and home location regis-
ter (HLR).
This authentication protocol is using secret key K and cryp-
tographic algorithms—including three message authentica-
tion codes f1, f ∗1 , and f2 and four key generation func-
tions f3, f4, f5, and f ∗5 [4–7] that are shared between MS
and the HLR/AuC. This is known as authentication and key
agreement protocol (AKA); also the AuCmaintains a counter
called sequence number (SQNHLR), and user mobile sta-
tion maintains a counter (SQNMS), the initial value for these
counters are set to zeroes [7–9].
There are three goals for the UMTS AKA [10]:
(1) the mutual authentication between the user and the
network;
(2) the establishment of a cipher key and an integrity key
upon successful authentication; and
(3) the freshness assurance to the user of the established
cipher and integrity keys.
There are two phases in AKA protocol [11]:
(1) the distribution of authentication vectors from the
HLR/AuC to the VLR/MSC;
(2) the authentication and key agreement procedure be-
tween the MS and the VLR.
As illustrated in Figure 1, UMTS authentication procedure
works as follows.
(1) MS sends international mobile subscriber identity
(IMSI) and authentication request to (VLR/SGSN)
(visitor location register/serving GPRS support node).
(2) VLR passes this authentication request to HLR.
(3) HLR Generates authentication vectors AV(1, . . . ,n)
and sends the authentication data response AV(1, . . . ,
n) toVLR/SGSN. Each authentication vector is called a
quintet. This AV consists of five components: the ran-
dom number (RAND), the expected response (XRES),
cipher key (CK), integrity key (IK) and authentication
token (AUTN). The authentication vectors are ordered
by the sequence number.
(4) VLR stores authentication vectors, selects authentica-
tion vector AV(i), and sends authentication request
(RAND (i), AUTN(i)) to MS. In the VLR one authen-
tication vector is needed for each authentication in-
stance. This means that the signalling between VLR
and HLR/AuC is not needed for every authentication
event.
(5) MS computes and retrieves the following:
(a) AK= F5 (Rand, K), SQN= ((SQN⊕AK)⊕AK),
computes expected message authentication code
XMAC = f1 (SQN ,RAND,AMF), and then
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Figure 2: Location registration areas.
(b) compares XMAC with MAC which is included
in AUTN. If XMAC is not equal to MAC, then
MS sends failure message to the VLR/SGSN, else
if XMAC is equal to MAC, then MS checks that
the received SQN is in the correct range, that is,
SQN > SQNMS. If SQN is not in correct range,
thenMS sends failure message to the VLR/SGSN,
else if it is in the correct range, then MS com-
putes the Response RES = f2 (K, RAND), and
CK = f3 (K, Rand), after that it sends RES to
VLR/SGSN.
(6) VLR compares the received RES with XRES. If they
match, then authentication is successfully completed.
3. ANALYSIS OF UMTS AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
The mobile station is continuously listening to the broadcast
message from MSC/VLR to identify the location area by us-
ing location area identity (LAI), theMS is comparing the LAI
which is received with the LAI stored in the USIM. When
the LAI is diﬀerent then the MS requires a new registration.
Figure 2 illustrates registration area boundary.
The registration occurs when the mobile is switched on,
or when it has moved from one registration area to a new
one. Movement of MS within the same registration area
will not generate any registration messages. The authenti-
cation processes is done in every registration, call originat-
ing, and call terminating. Figure 3 illustrates the signalling
messages flow for registration activity. Figure 4 illustrates
the signalling message flow for call origination and termi-
nation.
In our analysis, a fluid mobility model is used to investi-
gate and analyze the performance of signalling traﬃc, load,
and bandwidth that are generated by these protocols and the
delay in the call setup time. In this model, we have the fol-
lowing parameters:
(1) user who is carrying mobile station (MS) is moving at
an average velocity v;
(2) direction of MS movement is uniformly distributed
over [0, 2π];
(3) mobile users are uniformly populated with the density
ρ within the registration area;
(4) registration area (RA) boundary is of length L.
Then the rate of registration area crossing R, the average
number of active mobile crossing the registration area, is
given by
R = ρ · ν · L
π
. (1)
From (1), we can calculate the signalling traﬃc for regis-
tration, origination, and termination call. Mobile traﬃc of
network depends on the MS user’s movement. Table 1 sum-
marizes assumptions which are made to perform numerical
analysis.
The traﬃc due to authentication request at registration is
generated by mobile moving into new registration area, this
equals the number of deregistration (registration cancella-
tions). The rate of registration area crossing R is given by
Rregistration,RA = ρ · ν · L
π
,
Rregistration,RA = 328∗ 5.95∗ 32.451h∗ 60min∗ 6 s∗ π = 5.60 /s.
(2)
The rate of deregistration area crossing R is equivalent to the
rate of registration
RDeregistration,RA = 5.60 /s. (3)
The total number of authentication request message per sec-
ond that arrives at the HLR is
Rregistration,HLR
= Rregistration,RA∗Total number of registration area,
Rregistration,HLR = 5.60∗ 128 = 716.8 /s.
(4)
The total number of authentication requests due to call orig-
ination per serving network (SN) is equivalent to the total
number of authentications due to call termination per serv-
ing network. The total number of authentication requests
due to call origination per serving network (RCall orignation/SN )
is calculated as follows:
Rcall origination/SN
= call rate per user
= average call origination rate ∗ total of MS,
Rcall origination/SN = 2∗ 3.5 million1h∗ 60min∗ 60 s = 1944.4 /s.
(5)
The total number of calls terminated RCall termination/SN =
1944.4 /s.
The number of calls origination per registration area





RCall orignation/RA = 1944.4128 = 15.19 /s.
(6)
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Figure 3: UMTS signalling messages flow for registration.
The number of calls terminating per registration area
(RCall Termination/RA) is equivalent to the number of calls origi-
nating per registration area, RCall Termination/RA = 15.19 /s.
Table 2 summarizes the total authentication requests per
VLR and HLR for each type of activity as computed above.
From Figures 3 and ??fig:4 it can be summarized that the sig-
nalling messages flow for each activity registration, call orig-
ination, and call termination as shown in Table 3. The total
signalling traﬃc and load The transaction messages between
mobile databases (VLR andHLR) are shown in Table 4 which
are calculated from the values in Tables 2 and 3.
From the above equations and calculations, it has been
found that the relationships between velocity of movement
of users and the total authentication requests per VLR and
HLR for UMTS authentication process is directly propor-
tional, and the relationship between the registration area and
total authentication requests per VLR and HLR for UMTS
registration process is directly proportional.
The authentication delay is the time between the MS
starting to create a registration request until the completion
of the registration after the last successful signature verifi-
cation by the mobile node. Assume that the authentication
time delay is TAuth and the time delay to access VLR database
is the same as to access HLR database, and let this time be
TDB and let the time betweenMS andMSC be TMS-MSC. From
Figure 3, it can be seen that there are four messages between
databases (M2, M3, M4, and M5), and three messages be-
tweenMS and VLR/MSC (M1, M6, andM7). Then TAuth can
be computed as follows:
TAuth = 4∗ TDB + 3∗ TMS-MSC. (7)
Table 5 has the authentication parameters that enable us to
compute the bandwidth for each activity.
The size of messages between MS and VLR/MSC can be
calculated as follows.
(i) M1 is the 1st message which contains the parameters
IMS/TMSI, Service Request, and LAI, the length (L)
of M1, LM1 = L(IMSI/TMS) + L(Service Request) +L
(LAI),
LM1 = 128 + 8 + 40 = 176 bits. (8)
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Figure 4: UMTS call origination/termination signalling messages
flow.
Table 1: Assumption parameters.
Parameter Value
Total registration area (RA) 128
Square registration area size (8.65 km)2 = 74.8225 km2
Border length L 32.45 km
Mean density of mobile ρ 328 /km2
Total of MS 3.5 million
Average call origination rate 2 /h/user
Average call termination rate 2 /h/user
Average speed of user who
5.95 km/h
is carrying mobile, v
Table 2: Total authentication request per VLR and HLR.
Activity VLR/S HLR/S Total
Registration (Reg.) 5.60 716.8 722.4
Call termination (Term.) 15.19 1944.4 1959.59
Call origination (Orig.) 15.19 1944.4 1959.59
Total/network 35.98 4605.6 4641.58
Table 3: Signalling messages per authentication request for each
activity.
AuC HLR VLR Old VLR Total
2 4 5 1 12
2 4 5 0 11
2 4 5 0 11
6 12 15 1 —
Table 4: Total Signalling traﬃc and load transaction messages per
second for each activity in UMTS entity.
Activity AuC HLR VLR Old VLR Total
Registration 1433.60 2867.20 28.00 5.60 4334.4
Call termination 3888.8 7777.6 75.95 0 11742.35
Call origination 3888.8 7777.6 75.95 0 11742.35
Total 9211.2 18422.4 179.9 5.60 —




Random challenge RAND 128
Sequence number SQN 48
Anonymity key AK 48
Authentication management field AMF 16
Message authentication code MAC 64
Cipher key CK 128
Integrity key IK 128
Authentication response RES 32
Authentication token AUTN 128
Authentication vector AVas one record 544
Standard number of records
5
in authentication vector K
Location area identifier LAI 40
Service request 8
(ii) M6 is the sixth message which contains the parameters
Rand and AUTN, where
AUTN = (SQN ⊕ AK‖AMF‖MAC), (9)
and the length of AUTN = max[L(SQN),L(AK)] +
L(AMF) + L(MAC),
L(AUTN) = 48 + 16 + 64 = 128 bits.
L(M6) = L(Rand) + L(AUTN)
= 128 + 128 = 256 bits.
(10)
(iii) M7 is the seventh message which contains only Res.
L(M7) = L(Res) = 32 bits.
The size of the authentication messages between MS and
VLR/MSC is calculated as follows:
(
LMS-MSC
) = L(M1) + L(M6) + Lm(7)
= 464 bits = 58 bytes. (11)
The size of messages between databases can be calculated as
follows.
(i) M2 is the 2nd message which contains the parameters
IMS/TMSI, Service Request, and LAI; the length of M2
is equal to the length ofM1 = 176 bits.
(ii) M3 is the 3rdmessage which contains the same param-
eters as M2 the L(M3)= 176.
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Table 6: Bandwidth that is used between entities for current protocol.
Activity
Bandwidth Bandwidth
Totalbetween MS and between databases
VLR/MSC (B/S) (B/S)
Registration 324.8 2531.2 2856
Call Orig./Term. 881.02 6865.88 7746.9
Total/network 1205.82 9397.08 10602.9
MS VLR/SGSN HE/HLR
Generate authentication
vectors AV(1, . . . ,n)
IMSI, Rand   AUTN
IMSI, Rand   AUTN
Verify AUTN(i)
compute RES(i)HLR authentication response
RES(i)
Compare RES(i) & XRES(i)
Select CK(i) & IK(i) Compute CK(i) & IK(i)
Figure 5: The proposed authentications and key agreement protocol.
(iii) M4 is the 4th message which contains only AV. The
length of each AV is
L(AV) = L(Rand) + L(XRes) + L(CK) + L(IK) + L(AUTN)
= 128 + 32 + 128 + 128 + 128 = 544 bits.
(12)
For each AV generated from AuC that contains 5 rec-
ords, the total size is
L(AV) = 5∗ 544 = 3072 bits. (13)
The size of authentication messages between databases
is calculated as follows:
(
LDB
) = 176 + 176 + 2720 = 3616 bits = 452 bytes. (14)
The total size of messages in the authentication process is
LAuth = 464 + 3616 = 4080 bits = 510 bytes. As shown
in Table 2 for registration activity there are 5.60 authenti-
cation requests and for origination/termination call activity
there are 15.19 authentication requests. Table 6 summarizes
the bandwidth used betweenMS and VLR/MSC and between
databases.
4. THE PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL FOR
UMTSMOBILE NETWORKS
The secret key K , the cryptographic algorithms f1, f ∗1 , and
f2, and the four key generation functions f3, f4, f5, and f ∗5
are shared between MS and the HLR/AuC. The proposed
protocol here works as follows.
(1) MS generates authentication vector AV(1, . . . ,n) and
sends IMSI, RAND, and AUTN as authentication re-
quest to VLR/SGSN.
(2) VLR passes this authentication request to HLR.
(3) HLR computes and retrieves the following:
(a) AK= F5 (Rand, K), SQN= ((SQN⊕AK)⊕AK),
and the expected message authentication code
XMAC = f 1 (SQN, RAND, AMF);
(b) compares XMAC with MAC which is included
in AUTN. If XMAC is not equal to MAC then
HLR sends failure message to the VLR/SGSN,
else if XMAC equals MAC, then HLR checks that
the received SQN is in the correct range, that is,
SQN > SQNHLR. If SQN is not in the correct
range, then HLR sends failure message to the
VLR/SGSN, else if it is in the correct range, then
HLR computes response RES = f2 (K, RAND),
and CK = f3 (K,Rand), after that it sends RES
to VLR/SGSN.
(4) VLR compares the received RES with XRES. If they
match, then authentication is successfully completed.
Figure 5 illustrates the proposed UMTS authentication pro-
tocol.
5. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOL
From Figure 6, we can summarize the signallingmessages per
authentication for each activity registration, call origination,
and call termination as illustrated in Table 7. The total sig-
nalling traﬃc and load transaction messages between mobile
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Figure 6: Signalling messages flow for the proposed authentications protocol.
Table 7: Signalling messages per authentication request in the pro-
posed protocol.
Activity AuC HLR VLR Old VLR Total
Regist. 1 2 2 1 6
Call Term. 1 2 2 0 5
Call Orig. 1 2 2 0 5
Total 3 6 6 1 —
Table 8: Total signalling traﬃc and load transaction messages per
second for each activity in the proposed protocol.
AuC HLR VLR Old VLR Total
716.8 1433.6 11.2 5.60 2161.6
1944.4 3888.8 30.38 0 5863.58
1944.4 3888.8 30.38 0 5863.58
4605.6 9211.2 71.96 5.60 —
databases (VLR and HLR) are shown in Table 8 and are cal-
culated from the values in Tables 2 and 7.
The authentication delay for the proposed protocol TAuth
is computed as follows:
TAuth = 3∗ TDB + 1∗ TMS-MSC. (15)
To compute the bandwidth, there are four messages to au-
thentication; one of them is between MS and VLR/MSC and
the other three are between databases, the sizes of these mes-
sages can be computed as follows.
The size of messages between MS and VLR/MSC can be
calculated as follows.
(i) M1 is the 1st message which contains the parameters
IMS/TMSI, Service request, LAI, Rand, and AUTN, the
length (L) of M1,
LM1 = L(IMSI/TMS) + L(Servicerequest)
+ L(LAI) + L(Rand) + L(AUTN),
LM1 = 128 + 8 + 40 + 128 + 128 = 432 bits.
(16)
The size of the authentication messages between MS and
VLR/MSC is calculated as follows:
(
LMS-MSC
) = 432 bits = 54 bytes. (17)
The size of messages between databases can be calculated as
follows.
(i) M2 is the 2nd message in which the length of M2 is
equivalent to the length of M1 = 432 bits.
(ii) M3 is the 3rdmessage which contains the same param-
eters asM2 the L(M3) = 432 bits.
(iii) M4 is the 4th message which contains only RES, where
the length M4 = 32 bits.




) = 432 + 432 + 32 = 896 bits = 112 bytes. (18)
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Table 9: Bandwidth that is used between entities for the proposed protocol.
Activity
Bandwidth Bandwidth
Totalbetween MS and between databases
VLR/MSC (B/S) (B/S)
Registration 302.4 627.2 929.6
Call Orig./Term. 820.26 1701.28 2521.54
Total/network 1122.66 2328.48 3451.14
Table 10: Comparing signalling messages between the current and the proposed authentication protocol.
Current protocol Proposed protocol
Activity AuC HLR VLR Old VLR AuC HLR VLR Old VLR
Registration 2 4 5 1 1 2 2 1
Call Term./Orig 2 4 5 0 1 2 2 0
Table 11: Comparing total signalling traﬃc and load messages per second between entities for each activity.
Current protocol Proposed protocol
Activity AuC HLR VLR Old VLR AuC HLR VLR Old VLR
Registration 1433.6 2867.2 28 5 716.8 1433.6 11.2 5.6
Call Term./Orig 3888.8 7777.6 75.95 0 4876.19 3888.8 30.38 0
The total size of messages in the authentication process is
LAuth = 54 + 112 = 166 bytes.
As shown in Table 2 for registration activity, there are
5.60 authentication requests and for origination/termination
call activity, there are 15.19 authentication requests. Table 9
summarizes the bandwidth used between MS and VLR/MSC
and between databases.
6. SIMULATION RESULTS (COMPARISON AND
DISCUSSION)
The simulation study has been carried out in order to analyze
signalling traﬃc performance and load transaction messages
and bandwidth that is consumed between mobile networks
entities. The simulation is carried out by using diﬀerent mo-
bility rate.
The software we have used to simulate the current and
proposed authentication protocol is network simulator (NS-
2). NS-2 is an object-oriented, discrete event driven net-
work simulator developed at UC Berkely written in C++ and
OTcl.
The proposed authentication protocol preserved the
same security as such as the security available in the current
UMTS. The authentication and privacy are preserved. The
MS is still authenticated using the secret key and the authen-
tication result is computed first in the mobile SIM card then
it is sent to the AuC for verification and validation.
In the proposed protocol, the signalling messages are re-
duced between the mobile networks entities. Tables 10, 11,
12, and 13 illustrates the diﬀerences between current UMTS
authentication protocol and the proposed protocol. The






AuC 9211.2 4605.6 50
HLR 18422.4 9211.2 50
VLR 179.9 71.96 40
Total 27813.5 23171.56 50
current protocol needs 12 messages between mobile net-
works entities to perform registration or call termination,
but the proposed protocol needs 6 messages only to perform
registration or 5 messages for call termination.
The simulation results show that the authentication delay
and current load transaction messages between entities and
bandwidth are minimized comparing to current protocol, as
illustrated in Figures 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. Therefore, the per-
formance and the authentication delay time have been im-
proved significantly.
As shown in Table 12—which is extracted from Tables 4
and 8—the percentage of improvement is more than 50%.
From (7) and (15), where it is assumed that TDB = 1, the
proposed protocol has less delay than the current UMTS pro-
tocol as shown in Figure 7.
Varying the MS mobility rate (the speed of movement),
it can be seen in Table 14 that the proposed scheme is main-
taining the same level of improvement in terms of total net-
work signalling which is around 50 percent compared to the
conventional UMTS approach.
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Table 13: Comparing the bandwidth for each activity between database and VLR/MSC.
Bandwidth between MS and VLR and between databases
Current protocol Proposed protocol
Activity VLR/MSC Database Total VLR/MSC Database Total
Registration 324.8 2531.2 2856 302.4 627.2 929.6
Call Term./Orig 881.02 6865.88 7746.9 820.26 1701.28 2521.54
0 2 4 6 8 10 12

























































































Figure 9: Total signalling messages/second for all activity in current
and proposed protocol.









































Figure 10: Network signalling traﬃc with diﬀerent mobility rate.





















Figure 11: Comparing the bandwidth for each activity between
current and proposed protocol.
The advantage of the proposed scheme is the structure it-
self which is a very important issue in this analysis study. In
the current UMTS AKA, the challenge response is based on
challenging the MS after preparing the authentication vector
in the AuC. Then the VLR has to send the RAND num-
ber to the MS and waits for the response (SRES), and upon
comparison the authentication decision is taken. Our design
concept is based on the general form of the authentication
definition. The proposed protocol starts from preparing the
authentication result in the MS, then sending it to the AuC
for verification and validation in three messages only. Dereg-
istration of the old VLR in the proposed protocol is faster
than the current UMTS authentication protocol, which is vi-
tal in decreasing the total delay.
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Table 14: Network signalling traﬃc with diﬀerent mobility rate.
Current protocol Proposed protocol
Speed Rate AuC HLR VLR Total AuC HLR VLR Total
2 1.88 8259.06 16518.12 161.32 24938.50 4129.53 8259.06 64.53 12453.12
4.5 4.24 8863.22 17726.44 173.09 26762.75 4431.61 8863.22 69.23 13364.06
5.95 5.6 9211.38 18422.76 179.91 27814.65 4605.6 9211.2 71.96 13889.03
10 9.42 10189.30 203786 198.98 30766.88 5094.65 10189.3 79.59 15363.54
14 13.18 11151.86 2303.72 217.81 33673.39 5575.93 11151.86 87.12 16814
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the UMTS authentication and key agreement
protocol and the signalling traﬃc that are generated by
registration, call termination, and call origination have been
investigated and analyzed as well as the bandwidth that is
used between MS and VLR and between databases regis-
ters. The proposed authentication protocol has improved the
performance of authentication by reducing the authentica-
tion times, setup time, and data sizes. Also, the proposed au-
thentication mechanism has less signalling traﬃc and con-
sequently, the bottleneck at authentication center is avoided
significantly by reducing the number of messages between
mobile and authentication center. The proposed protocol
is tight for security, because no data-authentication vector
(AV) is stored in VLR/MSC and the AV is generated in the
mobile for each authentication request.
The proposed authentication for UMTS has been gener-
ated while keeping in mind that the complexity of this func-
tion is as low as possible while keeping a high level of security
and eﬃciency of the used bandwidth.
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